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An Isolation Order, Public Health Powers, and a Global Crisis
Howard Markel, MD, PhD
Lawrence O. Gostin, JD
David P. Fidler, JD
CENTURIES AFTER THE FORMAL CREATION OF QUAR-antine, the practice continues to evoke concernwhen implemented to halt the spread of danger-ous microbes. Witness the controversy gener-
ated by US citizen Andrew Speaker, whom the US Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) detained and iso-
lated because he was diagnosed with pulmonary disease
caused by extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-
TB). Speaker’s casemade compelling news, but it also raised
questions about the emergence of XDR-TB, the adequacy
of public health powers in the United States, and the inter-
national dimensions of the XDR-TB threat.
The Recent Encounter With XDR-TB
According tomedia reports,1-3 congressional testimony,4 and
official reports,5 physicians diagnosed Speaker with pulmo-
nary TB inMarch 2007. Hewas prescribed a regimen of stan-
dard anti-TB medications. Susceptibility testing deter-
mined that Speaker’s TB was multidrug resistant, which
prompted county public health authorities to advise Speaker
orally on May 10 not to travel but to consider specialized
treatment. Instead, Speaker advanced his travel by 48 hours
and flew from Atlanta, Georgia, to Paris, France, on May
12. From May 11 through 13, county public health offi-
cials tried to deliver written notice to Speaker that travel
would be against medical advice and would risk harming
others’ health. OnMay 22, the CDC confirmed that Speaker
had XDR-TB.
Speaker’s wedding and honeymoon took him to Greece
and then Rome, where the CDC contacted him by tele-
phone onMay 22 to informhim that he hadXDR-TB, should
not travel further on commercial airlines, and should re-
port to Italian health authorities while US officials pursued
options for his return home. Instead, Speaker flew to Pra-
gue, then to Montreal, Canada, and then drove into the
United States.
Although the CDCplaced Speaker’s name on a health sur-
veillance list, a US border guard allowed Speaker into the
United States despite seeing the CDC’s warning.1 Once in
the country, CDC located Speaker, instructed him to re-
port to Bellevue Hospital in New York City, New York, and
indicated that failure to do so would violate federal quar-
antine law. After 72 hours at Bellevue under a provisional
isolation order, Speaker was transported by the CDC to At-
lanta and a federal isolation order was issued against him.
This order was the first such federal order since a sus-
pected smallpox carrier was quarantined in 1963.6 Speak-
er’s travels forced the CDC and other public health authori-
ties frommultiple countries to try to locate hundreds of airline
passengers who may have been exposed to XDR-TB. Later,
Speaker was transferred under escort by a CDC quarantine
officer to the National Jewish Medical Center in Denver,
Colorado, for treatment.
The Emergence of the XDR-TB Problem
Media coverage of Speaker’s situation providedmany people
with an introduction to XDR-TB, which is the latest chapter
in humanity’s battle with the “white plague.” Once thought
under control in developed countries, TB cases increased in
the 1980s after funding cuts for TB prevention and treat-
ment programs and the emergence of the AIDS pandemic.
The reemergence of TB had the harshest consequences in the
developing world, particularly with the impact of HIV/AIDS
on susceptibility to TB infection. The increase in TB cases led
to an increase in inadequate or incomplete antibiotic treat-
ments, which produced resistant TB strains.7
Multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB) arose during this pe-
riod and includes TB strains that are resistant to at least 2
of the most commonly prescribed anti-TB drugs: isoniazid
and rifampin. MDR-TB often appears when a patient takes
an incomplete course of anti-TBmedications or is acquired
during exposure to air shared with other persons harbor-
ingMDR-TB, if infection control precautions are not imple-
mented or are inadequate. But XDR-TB is more problem-
atic because it is also resistant to any fluoroquinolone and
at least 1 of the 3 second-line drugs: capreomycin, kana-
mycin, and amikacin.8
Surveillance data on XDR-TB are still rudimentary, but
evenwith incomplete information, public health officials are
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alarmed. XDR-TB has appeared in many countries, includ-
ing the United States, and is of particular concern in East-
ern Europe, South Africa, and Asia.9 The issuance in 2006
by the World Health Organization (WHO) of a global alert
about XDR-TB10 underscores the harsh reality that XDR-TB
has the potential to transform a once treatable infection into
an infectious disease as deadly, if not more so, than TB at
the beginning of the 20th century.
XDR-TB and Quarantine
Speaker’s isolation has focused attention on the exercise of
public health powers, especially with respect to quarantine
and isolation at the local, state, federal, and international
levels. Definitions of quarantine have changed over the cen-
turies, but so too have political, legal, and cultural frames
of reference.
For most of the history of quarantine, the biggest con-
cerns related to lost commerce caused by closing ports or
cities to goods and travelers. During many historical eras,
governments sometimes abused quarantine powers by ap-
plying them against socially undesirable segments of popu-
lations perceived to be sickly or contagious.11 In other pe-
riods, quarantine has been contested for political and
nationalistic reasons. More recently, the perceived conflict
between individual rights and public health has dominated
quarantine debates. This trend has been strongest in demo-
cratic nations that emphasize civil liberties. Each frame of
reference remains important, which highlights the need to
understand how the law authorizes governments to engage
in quarantine activities.11
Legal Authority for Isolation and Quarantine
in the United States
TheComplexity ofQuarantine Law.Legal authority for pub-
lic health powers, including isolation and quarantine, ex-
ists at local, state, and federal levels. This situation pro-
duces problems related to federalism: Which level of
government may act? Which laws apply, and in what cir-
cumstances? Theoretically, local and state law addresses
threats confined to a single city, county, or state; federal law
applies to diseases arriving from foreign countries or being
transmitted across state lines.
Behind that theory lies a complex problem regarding the
“lead” government official in any given situation. Public
health emergencies require clear lines of authority, and the
Speaker case illustrates some breakdowns in this respect:
county public health officials were allegedly not clear in their
instructions to Speaker because they told him not to travel
but that he did not pose a risk to others; and a federal bor-
der guard let Speaker into the United States despite being
aware of CDC’s notification that Speaker should be de-
tained.1
State Quarantine Authority. State authority to compel
isolation and quarantine derives from the police power (Gib-
bons v Ogden, 22 US 1, 25 [1824]). Although all states have
authorized isolation and quarantine, these laws vary con-
siderably. Often, different approaches are not a problem, but
variation could prevent or delay effective responses to amul-
tistate emergency. Disparate legal structures can also un-
dermine cooperation among state and federal officials. In
addition, state quarantine laws are often old and do not re-
flect contemporary scientific understandings of disease or
changes in the protection of civil liberties.
In light of recent threats, states have begun to reconsider
quarantine authority within their emergency response sys-
tems. The president urged states to review their quarantine
authorities as a homeland security priority,12 and 38 states
have adopted, in whole or in part, the Model State Emer-
gency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA). Drafted in response
to the 2001 anthrax attacks, theMSEHPA requires the state’s
governor to declare an emergency before special quaran-
tine powers are exercised.13 The “Turning Point”Model State
Public Health Act, drafted in 2003, provides a range of pub-
lic health powers that do not require an emergency decla-
ration, but few states have used this model act to revise their
laws.14 The Speaker case will, again, encourage state gov-
ernments to revisit their quarantine laws.
Federal Quarantine Authority. Federal quarantine au-
thority grants the secretary of the US Department of Health
and Human Services the power to issue regulations to pre-
vent the introduction, transmission, or interstate spread of
communicable diseases into or within the United States and
to apprehend, detain, or conditionally release individuals
infected with “quarantinable diseases” specified by execu-
tive order.15 Infectious TB is a quarantinable disease.16
The Speaker case illustrates weaknesses in federal quar-
antine authority. First, federal powers apply only to a small
number of diseases, depriving the CDC of flexibility to re-
spond to novel threats. For a new threat, the president must
issue an executive order making the disease quarantinable,
as happened with SARS (severe acute respiratory syn-
drome) and pandemic influenza. Second, federal rules do
not authorize a range of powers, including screening, con-
tact tracing, and directly observed therapy, which may be
needed to address certain threats, including XDR-TB. Third,
federal quarantine law lacks adequate due process protec-
tions because it does not give affected individuals a right to
a fair hearing. Given constitutional requirements for an im-
partial hearing for anyone under civil detention or confine-
ment,17 including people with TB,18 federal quarantine pow-
ers are arguably unconstitutional.
ProposedRevisionstotheFederalQuarantineRegulations.
Recognizing these problems, the Department of Health and
Human Services proposed new regulations in late 2005.19
The proposed ruleswould expand the scope of federal power
by defining “ill person” to include those with signs or symp-
toms commonly associated with quarantinable diseases (eg,
fever, rash, persistent cough, or diarrhea), thus affordingCDC
greater flexibility. The proposed regulations would require
airlines and other carriers to screen passengers at borders;
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report cases of illness or death to the CDC; distribute health
alert notices to crew and passengers; collect and transmit
personal passenger information; order physical examina-
tion of exposed persons; and require passengers to disclose
information about their contacts, travel itinerary, andmedi-
cal history. The proposed rules also build more due pro-
cess protections into federal quarantine law, protections the
CDC included in Speaker’s isolation order (ie, a right to a
hearing, which Speaker decided not to pursue4).
The revisions to federal quarantine regulations proved con-
troversial and have not yet been adopted. Although the pub-
lic health community welcomed many proposed changes,
those concerned with potential invasions of liberty, pri-
vacy, and property criticized aspects of the proposal. The
travel industry complained about the costs imposed on it
to collect passenger data. Civil libertarians argued that the
new rules would not protect privacy adequately. Due pro-
cess advocates criticized the proposal for providing no right
to a hearing for “provisional” quarantines lasting up to 3
business days. In addition, the proposal did not address all
concerns about due process requirements for full quaran-
tine measures because it required quarantined individuals
to request a hearing, provided for informal proceedings, and
permitted aCDCemployee to preside over the hearing rather
than an impartial tribunal.
Speaker’s case has drawn attention to the future applica-
tion of quarantine powers by the federal government with
respect to XDR-TB. As with other disease threats, public
health officials need a range of powers, but they must ex-
ercise those powers fairly and in accordance with the rule
of law. XDR-TB may test the ability of governments in the
United States to balance public health and individual rights.
International Dimensions
Speaker’s odyssey also reveals the international dimen-
sions of XDR-TB, which highlight questions about how the
United States exercises public health powers in a global con-
text, how international law applies to XDR-TB, and what
strategies exist to address the global XDR-TB crisis.
Travel Restrictions on Persons Leaving theUnited States.
Speaker’s case raises questions about the government’s abil-
ity to prevent a person who poses a health risk from leav-
ing theUnited States. County officials orally advised Speaker
not to travel, but what government body could have pre-
vented him from traveling to Europe? Given the interna-
tional context, the federal government is the relevant con-
stitutional authority. Federal law focuses, however, on
preventing disease importation and does not mention pre-
venting disease exportation.15 Neither statutory law nor ex-
isting or proposed federal quarantine regulations address
the need to prevent persons in the United States who pose
a health risk from leaving the country.
Extrajurisdictional Application of US Public Health Law.
The CDC advised Speaker to report to Italian authorities,
but he did not follow this advice.4,5 This raises the question
of whether the United States can enforce federal quaran-
tine orders on US citizens in other countries. Federal law
does not apply outside the United States unless Congress
intends for it to so apply.20 Congress expressed no such in-
tent in federal public health law, prescribing that federal quar-
antine regulations “for the apprehension, detention, exami-
nation, or conditional release of individuals, shall be
applicable only to individuals coming into a State or pos-
session from a foreign country or a possession.”15
Screening for PublicHealthThreats atUSBorders. Speak-
er’s entry into the United States focuses attention on screen-
ing for health threats at US borders. Unlike Speaker’s situ-
ation, the typical problems concern the failure or inability
of border control systems to identify health threats. These
problems point to weaknesses in the system of quarantine
stations at US ports of entry. According to an Institute of
Medicine study, the small number of and traditional activi-
ties undertaken by quarantine stations “no longer protect
the US population against microbial threats of public health
significance that originate abroad.”21 This study recom-
mended improvements in leadership, legal authorities, in-
frastructure, training, funding, and collaboration to im-
prove the federal government’s ability to prevent disease
importation. Speaker’s case suggests that, despite improve-
ments, work remains to be done in this area.
XDR-TB and the New International Health Regulations.
Speaker’s case also raises broader concerns about the role
of international law in addressing XDR-TB. Here, the new
International Health Regulations, adopted inMay 2005 and
entered into force on June 15, 2007 (IHR 2005),22 deserve
attention. First, public health reactions to Speaker’s travels
demonstrate that XDR-TB casesmay constitute public health
emergencies of international concern that must be notified
toWHOunder the IHR 2005.22 As illustrated by the Speaker
episode, XDR-TB cases could satisfy the criteria of the IHR
2005 for determiningwhether an eventmay constitute a pub-
lic health emergency of international concern . The United
States notifiedWHO about the Speaker case on May 24 de-
spite the IHR 2005 not being in force. An obligation to re-
port XDR-TB cases could improve global surveillance. Fol-
lowing notification, the WHO director-general must
determine whether notified events actually constitute pub-
lic health emergencies of international concern and, if so,
must issue temporary recommendations guiding countries
in their response.22
A WHO task force argued that XDR-TB does not consti-
tute a public health emergency of international concern be-
cause such a declaration is “really only intended for out-
breaks of acute disease, rather than the ‘acute-on-chronic’
situation of . . . XDR-TB.”23 This interpretation is question-
able because the IHR 2005 never uses “acute disease” to de-
fine its scope. The reaction to Speaker’s case indicates that
XDR-TB is a dangerous pathogen of global concern. XDR-TB
may be an early test case for howWHOand itsmember states
apply the IHR 2005.
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Second, Speaker’s isolation order requires examination
of whether compulsory measures may be increasingly nec-
essary to contain XDR-TB around the world.24,25 The IHR
2005 recognizes the need for such measures but requires
that countries apply them in a manner consistent with sci-
entific, public health, and human rights principles.22
Addressing the Global Crisis of XDR-TB
Speaker’s travails partially lifted the veil on the global XDR-TB
crisis. How do the United States and the international com-
munity confront the emergence of XDR-TB around the
world? A host of challenges exist, including improving sur-
veillance, designing nonpharmacological interventions that
protect public health while respecting human rights, in-
venting better diagnostics, managing XDR-TB’s deadly syn-
ergy with HIV/AIDS, creating new antibiotics that are avail-
able in developing countries, and building health system
capacities to handle the burden of XDR-TB. The grimmarch
of TB from MDR-TB to XDR-TB does not bode well for
achieving the changes needed to produce robust global re-
sponses to the extremely drug-resistantmanifestation of the
white plague. XDR-TB threatens global health, challenges
the rule of law, and requires improved international coop-
eration.
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Public Health Benefits of Recent Litigation
Against the Tobacco Industry
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AS WITH LAWSUITS INVOLVING OTHER DANGEROUSproducts, litigation against the tobacco industrycan serve several important functions. Lawsuits cancompensate individuals harmedby the product and
can serve a public health purpose by encouraging manu-
facturers to change their products, sales, or marketing strat-
egies to reduce risks. Information obtained in litigation also
can be used to support future regulatory action.1
Litigation against the tobacco industry hasmetwithmixed
success.2 Between 1954 and 1994, private citizens filedmore
than 800 lawsuits against tobacco manufacturers.3 The to-
bacco companies achieved great success in court during this
time by challenging the science that tied smoking to nega-
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